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CONCLUSION 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ORDERING SUPPORT FOR JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY 
UNDER THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT 
OF SUPPORT ACT. 
JOHN DAVID AND JOHN JOSEPH ARE ENTITLED 
TO SUPPORT FROM THEIR FATHER, AND THEIR 
MOTHER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF 
SUPPORT FROM THE CHILDREN'S FATHER. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT RELIEVED OF HIS OBLI-
GATION TO SUPPORT HIS SONS BECAUSE THEIR 
STEPFATHER IS COUTRIBUTING TO THEIR SUPPORT. 
JOHN DAVID WAS NOT EMANCIPATED UNTIL HE 
REACHED THE AGE OF 18 &\ID WAS, THEREFORE, 
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT UNTIL HIS 18TH BIRTHDAY. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY RES 
JUDICATA FROM CONSIDERING THE ISSUES OF 
ONGOING SUPPORT AND ARREARAGES IN SUPPORT 
AT SEPARATE TIMES. 
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FRAL~CES 
vs 
JOHN W. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. BERNARD ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent ) Case No. 16895 
) 
ATTEBURY ) 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent concurs in appellant's statement of the 
nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent concurs in appellant's statement of the 
disposition of the case below. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the decision of the trial court 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent and appellant were divorced on September 7, 
1976, in the District Court for Sweetwater Cotmty, Wyoming. 
Pursuant to the divorce decree respondent was awarded the custody 
of the parties' two minor children. Defendant agreed to pay 
$500 per month, or $250 per child per month, as child support. 
(T. 60 line 28-30). This agreement was incorporated into the 
- 1 -
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divorce decree. 
The older son, John David dropped out of school in the 
fall of 1976 when he was in the 9th grade. (T.94). From that 
time to the time of the August, 1979, hearing, he lived con-
tinuously with one of his parents, and held, intermittently, 
several low paying short-term jobs. Most of the time he was 
living with his mother he was unemployed. (T.82 lines 20-30, 
T. 83,84). He was unable to secure steady employment because 
he was still a minor. (T.94 lines 15-19, T.89 lines 23-27). 
When he was employed he used the money as spending money 
(T.91 lines 16-25) and contributed to household expenses only 
sporadically (T. 92 lines 1-8). 
At the time of the hearing John David was seventeen years 
old (T. 87 lines 10-11) and engaged to be married "when he 
turned eighteen and could get a job." (T. 91 lines 2 7-30) . He 
was working on getting his high school diploma through the GED 
Program. (T. 76 lines 25-29). 
This action was connnenced on March 21, 1979, under the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act claiming support 
from January, 1979, the date the boys went to live with their 
mother in Wyoming. On May 31, 1979, the Third District Court 
entered an order temporarily reducing appellant's child support 
obligation to $150 a month for the support of John Joseph, the 
younger son, and reserving the issue of support for John David 
- 2 -
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until the Sweetwater County Attorney's Office investigated and 
ascertained the whereabouts of John David. After a hearing on 
August 22, 1979, at which appellant-respondent and John David 
testified and were cross-examined, the court ordered the appellant 
to pay $150 per month for the support of John David during the 
months of August, September, October, and November, 1979, at 
which time he reached the age of majority, and $150 per month as 
support for John Joseph. The court also ordered the appellant 
to pay to respondent $2000 in past due child support. In cal-
culating these amounts, Judge Dee relieved appellant of his 
obligation to support John David during two months in which the 
minor was employed. The order was signed August 31, 1979, and 
entered on September 5, 1979. 
On November 29, 1979, a new petition and order to show 
cause was issued against appellant. (R 24). A hearing was held 
on the question of whether the order of May 30, 1979, (R 11,12) 
was res judicata on the issue of John David's right to support. 
This hearing resulted in the consolidated order of January 16, 1980, 
signed by Judge Uno (R 40,41). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING SUPPORT FOR JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY UNDER 
THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT. 
- 3 -
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The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act gives 
the court of the responding state (in this case, Utah) some 
discretion in determining whether the obligor owes a duty of sup-
port and the extent of such duty. Two statutes bear this out. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-31-24 (1953 as amended 1980) states that 
"If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, 
it may order the respondent to furnish support or reimbursement 
therefor and subject the property of the respondent to such order." 
Utah Code Annotated 77-31-7 states: 
Duties of support applicable under this act 
are those imposed or imposeable under the 
laws of any state where the obligor was 
present during the period for which support 
is sought. The obligor is presumed to have 
been present in the responding state during 
the period for which support is sought until 
otherwise s]:lown. 
The court has discretion and that discretion is circumscribed by 
Utah law,as the defendant has, at all times relevant to this actioni 
resided in Utah. 
Utah law requires that the court in determining the 
amount of the obligation to support take into account several 
factors. Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7 states: 
"(l) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
amount granted by the prior court order tmless 
there has been a material change of circum-
stances on the part of the obliger or obligee. 
(2) Where no prior court order exists, or a 
material change in circumstances has occurred, 
the court in determining the amount of prospective 
support, shall consider all relevant factors 
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including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and the situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others." 
Appellant cites this statute in his brief but neglects 
to include subsection one which allows the court to give a 
great deal of deference to the existing support order unless 
there are changed circumstances. The court had already 
considered the issue of changed circumstances when it entered 
the order of May 31, 1979, which reduced appellant's child 
support obligation. However, in the hearing held before Judge 
Dee on August 22, 1979, the court again heard testimony which 
meets the requirements of U.C.A. 78-45-7 (1953 as amended). 
The record reflects ample evidence of appellant's 
ability to earn. He testified that he was a welder and boiler-
maker (T. 66 lines 6-9), a skilled tradesman, earning $12.00 
per hour. At the time of the hearing he had been unemployed 
for three weeks, although he expected a call from his union 
in the next weeks or days. (T. 67 lire 30, T. 68, line 1). He 
further testified that he ordinarily worked "a good share" of 
the year (T. 68 lines 2-5). Appellant's testimony as to his 
employment is strong evidence in support of the court's finding 
that he is financially able to pay child support. 
- 5 -
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While the record shows appellant to be a skilled 
laborer, respondent works in a bar (T. 80) and has, at times, 
had to resort to public assistance to maintain herself and 
the boys. (T. 79). 
The record is replete with evidence that all relevant 
factors were considered by the court relating to the issue 
of support even though the parties had already agreed to re-
duce the ongoing amount. Since the court's ruling is supported by 
ample evidence, there is no show~ng that the court abused its dis-
cretion in ordering support for John David, and the ruling 
should not be overturned on appeal. 
POINT II 
JOHN DAVID AND JO~N JOSEPH ARE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT 
FROM THEIR FATHER, AND THEIR MOTHER IS ENTITLED TO 
REIMBURSEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE CHILDREN'S FATHER. 
It is well settled law in Utah that a child has a right 
to be supported by his or her father. This right of support 
cannot be waived by the child himself, Utah Fuel Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 27 P.2d 434, 83 Utah 166 (1930), or 
bartered away by the custodial parent. Price v. Price 4 U.2d 
153, 289 P.2d 1044 (1955), Riding v. Riding 8 U.2d 136, 320 P.2d 
878 (1958), Gulley v. Gulley 470 P.2d 127 (1977), DeBry v. DeBry 
27 U.2d 237, 496 P.2d 92 (1972), Baggs v. Anderson 528 P.2d 141 
(1974). So long as the parent and child are both living, the 
right to support can only be extinguished by adoption (Riding, 
supra) or by emancipation. Stanton v. Stanton 421US.7 (1975). 
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A party who provides support is entitled to reimbursement 
for that support. Baggs v. Anderson, supra, French v. Johnson 
401 P.2d 315, 16 U.2d 360 (1965). This is true whether the party 
is the state, as in the case of Clark v. Department of Social Ser-
vices, 554 P.2d 1320 (1976) or the stepparent and parent as in 
French v. Johnson. 
The case of Wasescha v. Wasescha 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) 
is distinguishable from the instant case. In Wasescha the mother 
specifically testified that she was not requesting reimbursement 
of money expended for support but that the money recovered would 
be placed in a trust fund for the children's education. In this 
case, though, the mother. is asking for reimbursement of money 
she has expended for the boys' support. She has a right to 
contribution and reimbursement for the boys' support under the 
divorce decree dated September 7, 1976, which gave her the right 
to $500 per month as child support. The court in Wasescha 
recognized that a parent had the right to be reimbursed even 
though she did not have the right to collect past child support 
payments to put into a fund for future use by the children. That 
is all the mother is asking for here - reimburs'ement for past 
money already expended and aid in future support of the child 
who is still a minor. That the mother needed help from the 
father is evidenced by the fact that for a few months of the 
time in question the mother had to resort to public assistance 
to support the boys and herself (T. 79 lines 26-30, T.80 lines 
1-3). 
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The children and their mother had a right under the 
divorce decree to receive $250 per month per child as support 
from appellant. He initially agreed to pay this amount (T.60 
line 28). If the father felt this was an unreasonable amount 
he could have gone to court at any time to request a modifica-
tion of the child support provisions on grounds of changed 
circumstances. However, once the amounts became due, they 
became unalterable and could not be modified. Larson v. Larson, 
561P.2d1077 (1977 Utah). As to past due amounts, then, re-
spondent is entitled to full reimbursement. 
The minor children of the parties will not receive 
double support as a result of the trial court's ruling. They 
will only receive what is the right of any child, the support of 
both its father and mother. U.C.A. 78-45-3, U.C.A. 78-45-4. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT RELIEVED OF HIS OBLIGATION 
TO SUPPORT HIS SONS BECAUSE THEIR STEPFATHER 
IS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR SUPPORT. 
The obligation of a stepparent to support a stepchild 
was established by legislation in Utah in 1979. Until U.C.A. 
78-45-4.l and U.C.A. 78-45-4.2 were enacted there was no 
statutory duty on the part of a stepparent to support his 
stepchild. Appellant has not offered any evidence that Wyoming 
law places any obligation on Mr. Bernard to support his step-
children. Utah law is not applicable in determining the obliga-
tion of Mr. Bernard to support his stepsons because the choice 
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of law provisions of U.C.A. 77-31-7 (1953 as amended 1980) apply 
to the duty of the obligor to support, not some third party 
who has never been within the jurisdiction of Utah courts. It 
is doubtful that the statut~ would apply to Mr. Bernard anyway 
since much of his conduct as a stepfather antedated the 1979 
statute. 
Even assuming that the Utah law does apply to Mr. 
Bernard, it would not relieve appellant of the duty to support 
his offspring. The statutes relied upon by appellant are 
part of a larger section of the code concerning the public 
support of children, U.C.A. 78 sections 45, 45a, and 45b. 
Repeatedly throughout the sections the legislature expresses 
the intent that children should be supported by their natural 
parents in an effort to alleviate the burden borne by the 
general citizenry through welfare. U.C.A. 78-45b-l.l. It 
seems faily clear that the intent of the legislature in 
enacting U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 and U.C.A. 78-45-4.2 was to clear up 
a loophole that existed in these statutes. This loophole 
allowed stepparents to shift the burden of supporting their 
stepchildren off onto the state. 
The statutes cited by the appellant do not have the 
effect of shifting the duty of support to a stepparent. They 
simply denominate an additional person to whom the state can turn 
to to enforce the child's right of support. The statute does not 
say that the stepparent is responsible for support to the 
- 9 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exclusion of the natural parent. In fact, the legislature 
added U.C.A. 78-45-4.2 to insure that U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 not be 
interpreted so as to reach that result. It states: 
"Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve 
the natural or adoptive parent of the primary 
obligation of support: Furthermore, a stepparent 
has the same right to recover support for a step-
child from a natural or adoptive parent as any 
other obligee." (Emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the parents' obligation to support a child 
exists until the child reaches majority or until the parents' 
rights are ended by adoption. Riding v. Riding, 8 U.2d 136, 320 
P.2d 828 (1958). A stepparent's obligation, on the other hand, 
extends only until the relationship with the child's natural 
or adoptive parent is terminated by divorce U.C.A. 78-45-4.1. 
It is clear that appellant's reliance on U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 
is misguided and that the enactment of this statute did not 
relieve appellant of the primary obligation to support his sons. 
POINT IV 
JOHN DAVID WAS NOT EMANCIPATED UNTIL HE REACHED 
THE AGE OF 18 AND WAS, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO 
SUPPORT UNTIL HIS 18TH BIRTHDAY. 
The appellant claims several factors that he says led 
to a conclusion that John David was emancipated. These factors 
are that John David was not attending school, that he was 
employed occasionally when able to find work, that he owned 
three cars, and that he was engaged to be married. On the 
other hand, there are several factors which militate against a 
- 10 -
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finding of emancipation. During the entire period in question 
he lived with either the respondent or the appellant (T.87 lines 
21-24, T. 76 lines 4-28). He received support from either his 
mother or his stepfather during most of this time (T. 76 lines 4-28, 
T. 86 lines 10-22, T. 91 lines 16-26,T.92 lines 1-11) and was 
only 17 years old at the time of the hearing. (T. 87 lines 10-11). 
There was no formal or informal agreement to emancipate him; 
further, he was not married or in the military. (T.91 lines 27-30). 
There is no case law in Utah on what constitutes emanci-
pation. There is, however, a fair amount of case law in other 
jurisdicticnsgiving standards for emancipation. 
It seems fairly clear from the start that the child's 
acts alone cannot constitute emancipation. Utah Fuel Company, 
supra, Neisen v. Neisen 38 Wis.2d 599, 157 NW.2d 660, 32 ALR 3d 
1047 (1968). The parent must emancipate the child through 
actions that evidence an intent to emancipate the child, Tencza v. 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 527 P.2d 97, 111 Ariz. 226 (1974). 
The party wishing to prove emancipation has the burden of proof. 
Holmes v. Raffo 374 P.2d 536, 60 Wash. 2d 421 (1962). 
Among the elements to be considered in determining 
whether a child is emancipated are: 
(1) Whether the child lived with his parents or lived 
alone, Tencza v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, supra. 
(2) Whether the parent provided support for the child. 
Tencza, supra; Fevig v. Fevig 559 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1977). 
- 11 -
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(3) The age of the minor. Fevig, supra. 
(4) The intention and agreement of the parties Teneza, 
supra. 
(5) The ability of the minor to be self-supporting. 
Fevig, supra. 
(6) Whether the parent claiming emancipation has enough 
control over the child to emancipate him. Bates v. Bates 310 NYS 
2d 26 (1970). 
(7) Whether the child is married or entering military 
service. 58 ALR 2d 355, ALR 2d 1414, Sanders v. Levine 384 NYS 2d 
636 (1976). 
The authorities are virtually unanimous in declaring 
that marriage will emancipate a minor. Sanders v. Levine 384 
NYS 2d 636 (1976), 58 ALR 2d 355 annotation. There are strong 
policy reasons for requiring a child who takes upon himself 
the adult obligations of marriage and a family to give up the 
protections of childhood. However, these same policy considera-
tions do not exist where the child is only contemplating marriage. 
Because of the minor's youth and inexperience, &0ciety encourages 
a child to think very seriously about marriage before entering 
into it. We don't want to penalize teenagers who are contemplat-
ing marriage by taking away all parental obligations the minute 
they announce an engagement. Nor do we wish to permanently 
deprive them of support thereafter even if they back out of 
their marriage plans. Therefore, this court should not find that 
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an engagement to marry is enough to constitute emancipation. 
The residence of a child is important in determining 
whether a child has been emancipated because it goes to the 
issue of parental support and control. It is much more likely 
that a child is emancipated if he is living away from home, 
because his parents have less opportunity to control him or 
provide him with sustenance. The residence of a minor is also 
important evidence of the intent of the parties, where there is 
no formal agreement as to whether the child is emancipated. 
John David has lived with one parent or the other 
continuously. (T.87 lines 21-24). Although this is not conclu-
sive evidence of lack of emancipation it weighs very heavily 
against emancipation. Because he was living with his mother 
and/or father they had opportunity to control his actions or 
behavior. The fact that his mother supported him so readily 
and let him live at home is also strong evidence that she lacked 
the requisite intent to emancipate the child. The fact that 
he lived with his father is evidence that his father lacked 
the intent to emancipate him, as well. 
The· fact that his mother supported him is not only 
evidence of lack of intent to emancipate but also evidence of 
John David's own inability to support himself. (T. 77 lines 1-17). 
If the parent did support the child it is a pretty good indicator 
that the child was not really able to fend for himself. 
The age of the minor is critical as well. Not only 
does John David's age, 17, give a clue as to his mental and 
ph emotional maturity,it also indicates 
- 13 -
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a handicap in his ability to support himself. Many job oppor-
tunities are not available to persons under the age of 18 or 21 
(T.89 lines 23-27, T.94 lines 18-19, T.76 lines 21-24). Even 
more job opportunities are foreclosed by a lack of education and 
experience. Without the right to parental support he will have 
a difficult time making up for his deficiencies in education or 
training including the GED he intends to complete (T. 76 lines 
26-30). 
Even if a minor is emancipated from a parent's control 
the parent may still be required to support him if he is in 
need or the person who is supporting him requests reimbursement. 
Fevig, supra, Neisen, supra. Most courts look with strorgdisfavor 
on a parent who tries to ~hift the burden of supporting his child 
off onto another person o~ the public by claiming emancipation. 
Public policy requires a strong showing of a child's ability to 
fend for himself without aid before releasing his parents from 
the obligation of support. John David was clearly having problems s~ 
porting himself at such a young age and with so little education, 
because he was out of work most of the time (T.96,97). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have been very reluctant 
to relieve a divorced father of child support payments because 
he claims the child is emancipated. Neisen, supra; Bates, supra. 
This is especially true where the father does not have custody of 
the child. The court in Bates even went so far as to say that a 
non-custodial parent lacked the ability to emancipate the child on 
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his own because the non-custodial parent had nothing to lose and 
everything to gain from the emancipation. The Bates court said 
that the father did not have any control over his son to relinquish 
and so he could not intend that his son be emancipated. Practically 
speaking, this makes good sense. If parents could unilaterally 
emancipate their children there would be millions of disgrunted 
non-custodial parents around the country who would declare their 
children emancipated and be free of the obligation to provide 
child support. 
The bottom line in the issue of emancipation is the 
intent of parents to emancipate the child, and the burden of 
proving that intent is on the person asserting emancipation. 
Holmes v. Raffo, Tencza v, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Fevig v. 
Fevig. The fact that John David lived at home, received support 
from his family, was only 17, was single , and was unable to 
provide for his own needs continuously suggest very strongly 
that there was no emancipation. The fact that John David's 
father, the appellant, has so much to gain by a finding of 
emancipation is a suspicious circumstance indeed, and his conten-
tion of emancipation should be very carefully scrutinized. The 
fact that the trial court felt he did not meet his burden of proof 
is very significant and this court should not overturn its decision 
in light of the substantial evidence which supports its finding. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY RES JUDICATA 
FROM CONSIDERING THE ISSUES OF ONGOING SUPPORT AND 
ARREARAGES IN SUPPORT AT SEPARATE TIMES. 
Before an issue or a cause of action can be precluded 
by res judicata the following elements must exist. There must 
be a prior adjudication, which goes to a final judgment on the 
issue in question. The claims in both cases must be identical 
and in some instances, the parties must be identical , as well. 
The purpose of res judicata is to force parties to liti-
gate all parts of their cause of action in the same suit. This 
cuts down on the waste of the court's time and assures that the 
matter is totally settled between the parties. If the court 
finds that an issue or cause of action has been litigated between 
the parties previously, the parties are barred from raising 
the issue or cause of action in a new suit. East Mill Creek 
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City 159 P.2d 863 (1945). 
The final element, that of a prior suit, is missing 
in this fact situation. All of the actions taken and orders 
made in this case have occurred in just one lawsuit brought 
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. De-
fendant argues that because arrearages were not brought up 
in the initial hearing the plaintiff is estopped to raise the 
issue now. However, a recent Utah Supreme Court decision has 
held that even where there was more than one suit between the 
parties, if an important issue which could have been litigated 
was not actually litigated, the court may hear the issue and 
reach a decision on it. 
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~ P.2d 1000 (1979). In the instant case there was only one 
suit and an important issue was not litigated. As in the 
Connnercial Security case there was no final judgment reached 
between the parties on this critical issue and it would be 
inequitable to deny the parties the right to litigate the issue. 
In the case of Ray v. Consolidated Freightways 289 P.2d 
196 (1955) the court allowed a suit between two tort-feasors for 
damage to equipment even though in the original suit against 
both defendants, the court had found only one of the defendants 
liable to the plaintiff. The cross-claim between the two 
defendants could have been brought in the original suit, but 
was not. The court held that the new claim was not barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. Quoting Justice Field in Cromwell 
v. Sacramento County 94 US. 351 (1877) the court said. 
Where there is a different claim or demand, 
judgment in a prior action operates as an 
estoppel only to those matters in issue, 
or controversy upon the determination of 
which the finding or verdict was rendered. 
Inquiry must always be as to the point or 
question actually litigated or determined 
in the original action, not what might have 
been thus litigated and determined. Only 
upon such matters is the judgment con-
clusive in another action. 289 P.2d 196,199. 
This is especially so in child support cases. The 
general custom in the community among attorneys is to discuss 
current and ongoing support rights in one hearing and arrearages 
in another hearing. The main reason for this bifurcation is the 
immediate need to provide for the child as those needs manifest 
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themselves. Another reason is the desire of the plaintiff's 
counsel not to overburden the father at the outset with 
arrearages and thus lose the cooperation of the father from 
the start. 
These are legitimate reasons for having two separate 
hearings for the separate issues. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Harmon v. Harmon 491 P.2d 231 (1971) recognized that a divorce 
is an equitable proceeding and as such, the courts had power 
to issue stays of execution on arrearages in child support 
payments where it is necessary to allow the father to earn a 
living or to gain his cooperation in the long run. If the 
courtshave the power to issue stays of executions in child 
support cases, the court mµst surely have the power to divide 
i 
up the proceedings so as ~o insure the greatest cooperation 
from the father. The cour~ said in Harmon: 
In order to carry out the important respon-
sibility of safeguarding the interests. and 
welfare of children it has always been 
deemed that courts have broad equitable 
powers. To accept the plaintiff's conten-
tion that an adjudged arrearage is tantamont 
to a judgment in law would, in the long run, 
tend to impair rather than enhance the 
abilities of both the plaintiff and the 
court to accomplish the desired objective . . . . 
For the foregoing reasons decrees and orders in 
divorce proceedings are of a different and 
higher character than judgments in suits as 
law .... 491 P.2d 231, 232. 
Another reason that arrearages were not discussed 
in the first hearing was that the facts were not completely 
capable of ascertainment at that time. Therefore, the court 
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delayed findings on the issue until it could be ascertained 
where John David was living and how he was being supported. 
Order of May 31, 1979. This was to the defendant's benefit as 
well as the plaintiff's, and the defendant should not be allowed 
to complain about the division in hearings under these circumstances. 
The ord~r of May 31, 1979, specifically states that it is temporary. 
It also states that the County Attorney's Office in Green River, 
Wyoming, was ordered to investigate the whereabouts of John David 
because the court did not know where he was at that time. The 
amended stipulation of July 2, 1979, is even more emphatic 
that there are additional facts which need to be ascertained. It 
is true that these facts were necessary mainly for detennining 
ongoing support of John David, but they are also relevant to 
the issue of arrearages. Thus, the orders given could not be 
final because important issues were left to be determined. 
In Kiepe v. Le Cheminant 22 U.2d 334, 453 P.2d 140 (1969) 
the trial court entered a judgment after trial which stated that 
"all disputes which now exist or shall arise (between the partners 
in the business) are subject to the jurisdiction of the court." 
One of the partners later sued and the other partner defended on 
the grounds that the previous judgment was ~ judicata. The 
Supreme Court held that the judgment was conditional because it 
looked forward to the ascertainment of further information and 
further resolution of disputes between the parties. Because the 
judgment was conditional it could not be res judicata as to 
further matters. 
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The "judgment" in this case is even more conditional 
than the judgment in Kiepe. The judgment in this case unmis.-
takeably looks forward to the ascertainment of further informa-
tion. It definitely looks forward to the resolution of further 
disputes because, by its own terms, it is only temporary. 
Because the issue of arrearages was not and could not 
be litigated at the time of the May, 1979, order, because the order 
was only conditional, because all actions have taken place in one 
lawsuit, and because policy considerations dictate a need for 
special flexibility in the timing of arrearages and ongoing 
support hearings,. this court should hold that the trial court 
was correct in dismissing appellant's res judicata defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Children have a right to be supported by their parents. 
Parents cannot avoid that obligation simply because the child's 
stepparent or the child himself is contributing toward the child's 
support. The primary duty of support lies with the parent, and 
persons who step in and provide support are entitled to reim-
bursement. U.C.A. 78-45-4.2, French v. Johnson, Baggs v. Anderson. 
The child's right to support exists until he is adopted, 
reaches majority, or is emancipated. Riding v. Riding, Stanton v. 
Stanton. Whether a child is emancipated is an issue of fact, 
but courts should be cautious as to find emancipation only where 
the person claiming emancipation has proved the emancipation. 
Holmes v. Raffo. This is especially true where, as here, a father 
is claiming emancipation of a child whom he has a dutv to ~nnnni:t, 
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but over whom he has no control or custody. 
In all cases, but particularly so in divorce cases, 
important issues which were not actually litigated should not be 
precluded by res judicata. Connnercial Security Bank v. Corporation 
Nine. This is especially true here, where the issue of arrearages 
was dependent on information which was not available and could not 
be ohtained at the time of the first hearing. The order which 
resulted from the first hearing was conditional on its face and 
therefore, cannot act as res judicata in further proceedings Kiepe 
v. Le Chemin ant . 
Therefore, respondents pray that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed and that the court rule that the appellant 
is not relieved of his duty to support his sons. Specifically, the 
respondents pray that the court find that custodial parents and 
stepparents have a right to reimbursement for monies expended in 
the support of a non-custodial parent's child. The court should 
also find that a child is not emancipated simply because he holds 
intermittent jobs or is engaged to be married. Finally, the court 
should hold that plaintiffs are not precluded from raising the 
issue of arrearages because, for good cause, they failed to raise 
the issue in a hearing to determine ongoing support. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake Cotmty Attorney 
BY:.~ )JI t:~ 
SANDRA N. PEULER c:: 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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